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A Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) is an agreement between a real estate 
developer and a local community in which the developer agrees to mitigate the 
impacts of a real estate development in exchange for the community’s forbearance 
from protesting the development project. This thesis focuses on land use CBAs, a 
subset of CBAs, which are entered into in exchange for a community’s agreement to 
forbear from protesting the developer’s land use application to the local government. 
Land use CBAs disrupt the traditional community - local government - developer 
dynamic by transforming the adversarial relationship between the developer and the 
community into one of mutual agreement. CBAs provide communities with 
additional leverage in the land use decision-making process. The thesis aims to 
provide CBA practitioners with a roadmap for understanding the legal issues 
inherent in CBAs, and strategies for negotiating a valid and enforceable CBA. 
 
This thesis utilizes legal and planning scholarship, case law, interviews with CBA 
experts and news articles to reach its findings. While courts have not yet ruled on the 
constitutionality or enforceability of CBAs, as CBAs become more prevalent, legal 
challenges may soon arise. These challenges will likely focus on the level of local 
government involvement and whether the local government engaged in 
impermissible regulatory takings, and therefore, communities should recognize the 
legal risk presented by including local government in the process. Communities 
should pursue one of two CBA negotiation strategies: (1) a direct negotiation with 
the developer, without local government assistance, thereby enabling a wider range 
of benefits, or (2) a negotiation with the developer with the local government’s 
assistance, thereby limiting the scope of the range of benefits.   
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a. Legal constraints on Community Benefits Agreements  
 
This thesis will explore the legal constraints on the public’s ability to 
advocate for its interests through New York City’s land use approval process. Land 
use and real estate development in the United States are governed by three distinct 
stakeholders: (i) the real estate developer, (ii) the local government and (iii) the 
neighbors, the self-interested subset of the general public that is situated 
geographically closest to the proposed development or rezoning. For ease of 
reference, this third party is referred to throughout as the neighbors or the 
community.1 
 This thesis analyzes the legal constraints to the community’s ability to gain 
more leverage in the land use decision-making process by entering into a 
Community Benefits Agreement (a CBA) with a developer. A CBA is a side agreement 
between the developer and the community which operates as a legal tool under 
contract law to mitigate the impacts of a development for a community from a 
developer seeking land use approvals or government subsidies and minimize the 
related resistance for the developer.  
 This thesis distinguishes between two different types of Community Benefits 
Agreements: the “land use CBA” and the “economic development CBA”. A developer 
                                                        
1 Robert C. Ellickson, Vicki L. Been and Christopher Serkin, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials.  
(Aspen, 2005), 73. 
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generally enters into a “land use CBA” in exchange for a community’s agreement to 
forbear from protesting the developer’s land use application. Land use CBAs arose 
within a context where the developer and the community assume adversarial roles 
advocating for or against a change to the land use status quo, and the local 
government serves as a regulatory body and the final arbiter.  This tripartite 
stakeholder dynamic, and particularly the judicially defined role of the local 
government as a regulatory body, is symptomatic of the courts’ sensitivity to zoning 
initiatives that could constitute regulatory takings violating the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  The land use CBA disrupts this tripartite stakeholder 
dynamic by transforming the adversarial relationship between the developer and 
the community into one of mutual agreement, and thereby disrupting the checks 
and balance of the formal land use decision-making process.  
In addition to land use CBAs, a developer could enter into an ”economic 
development CBA”. Developers enter into economic development CBAs in order to 
receive subsidies or improve its development proposal in response to a Request for 
Proposals (or sometimes, as a condition of its development proposal). The economic 
development CBA increases the developer’s chances of obtaining government 
subsidies for a development project or being selected as the developer for a project. 
In the economic development CBA context, the relationship between the three 
stakeholders is quite different, particularly the role of the local government. The 
local government, instead of acting in as a regulatory body serving as neutral arbiter 
(as it does in the land use context), is now a market participant, offering subsidies, 
tax credits, or other incentives to the developer in exchange for a development 
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which addresses certain policy or legal goals. The local government is not 
constrained by the Fifth Amendment when entering into subsidy or disposition 
agreements. 
This thesis analyzes land use CBAs (as opposed to economic development 
CBAs) as a mechanism for empowering the community to participate with greater 
agency in the land use approval process than current land use decision making 
processes  allow. Land use CBAs, as private agreements operating outside of the 
regulations of the land-use decision making process, enable the parties to prevent or 
resolve the conflict using a contract-based legal tool. 
Using case law, scholarly articles, and interviews with practitioners, I 
researched the legal constraints of CBAs as a contemporary negotiating tool for the 
public to access benefits from a developer seeking land use approvals from a local 
government. I limited the scope of the thesis to land use CBAs because of their 
impact on the tripartite stakeholder dynamic and the legal difficulties of structuring 
benefit agreements between these distinct parties. The thesis concludes with 
strategic recommendations for neighbors pursuing a CBA with a developer seeking 
land use approvals.  
My intent is to provide community organizations and CBA practitioners with 
a working understanding of how to structure the CBA negotiating process so that 
the resulting CBA is legally enforceable and provides for appropriate benefits. In 
order to negotiate, implement and enforce a CBA, a community organization must 
know: (i) how to distinguish a land use CBA from an economic development CBA, 
(ii) the nuances differentiating public and private agreements, (iii) how to evade or 
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succeed against a Nollan/Dolan legal challenge threatening the enforceability of the 
CBA, (iv) the State Action Doctrine, (v) basic tenets of contract law and (vi) why 
CBAs are attractive in NYC.  
 b. Land use law in the United States  
 
 Land use law in the United States is a mechanism for mediating between 
property developers seeking to change the status quo, the local governmental body 
with jurisdiction over land use approvals, and the community of local residents and 
businesses concerned about their property.2 While these three stakeholders do not 
hold equal power in the land use approval process, they keep each other in check.3  
The developer-local government-neighbor dynamic, which I call the “tripartite 
stakeholder dynamic”, informs and is informed by the land use decision-making 
process and land use law.  
 Zoning, the regulatory structure that controls land use, has guided the 
tripartite stakeholder dynamic since the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the 
use of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler in 1926.4 However, since Euclid, local governments 
have evolved from acting purely as an administrator to actively partnering with 
                                                        
2 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls, 73. “A typical land use dispute is a drama 
featuring three main sets of players: (1) The developer (who usually owns the land or holds an 
option to purchase the land)…(2) The neighbors of the land in dispute (or others situated farther 
away but still threatened by the negative consequences of the proposed activity) are the developer’s 
first and main line of opposition…(3) The general-purpose local government in which the land is 
located is in the principal institution for reconciling the competing interests of the developer and the 
neighbors.”  
3 The politics of rezoning and the developer-local government-neighbor power dynamic is the 
discussion of many land use and political theorists’ work. See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use 
Controls, 302-309. Some contend that Neighbors are powerful because they elect the local 
government, others contend the developers are powerful because of the capital they bring to the 
community, others contend that the local government controls the dynamic. Identifying the sources 
of power is outside of the scope of this thesis. Instead this thesis is focusing on Community benefits 
agreements as an open, legal device that may or may not shift the balance of this dynamic. 
4 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
 8 
developers.5 While the court in Euclid upheld a local government’s right to 
administer land use regulations, such as zoning, courts have pushed back on a local 
government’s use of zoning power to actively shape individual development 
projects due to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.6 The courts are wary of 
zoning agreements or approvals that appear too contract-like. Contract zoning, 
initially struck down by the courts, occurs when “the local government conditioned 
rezoning on so many particulars that the arrangement resembled a contract”.7 In 
light of these judicial constraints, local governments and communities have pursued 
other means for obtaining benefits from real estate developers seeking land use 
approvals.  
In New York City, the tripartite stakeholder dynamic is formally regulated by 
the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) process.8 The dynamic also plays 
out in informal processes such as meetings and negotiations between the developer 
and the local government and/or the community outside of the regulated ULURP 
hearings. According to the Department of City Planning’s website  
[t]he Charter's intent in requiring ULURP was to establish a standardized 
procedure whereby applications affecting the land use of the city would be 
publicly reviewed… Key participants in the ULURP process are now the 
Department of City Planning (DCP) and the City Planning Commission (CPC), 
                                                        
5 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls.  
6 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from seizing private property 
without just compensation. 
7 Vicki Been, “Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation 
on the Exactions Theme?,” Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy Working Paper, 2010, 5. 
8 See New York City Department of City Planning website, “The Uniform Land Use Review 
Procedure”, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (Accessed February 2013). For 
ULURP Rules see New York City Department of City Planning website – ULURP Rules  
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulrule.shtml (Accessed March 2013) 
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Community Boards, the Borough Presidents, the Borough Boards, the City 
Council and the Mayor.9  
 
The land use approval process formally begins when a real estate developer 
submits an application to New York City (the local government) for approval.10 The 
developer then participates in a series of public hearings and approvals. The 
Community Board, an appointed quasi-governmental board plays, an “important 
advisory role... Applications for a change in or variance from the zoning resolution 
must come before the board for review, and the board's position is considered in the 
final determination.”11 The Community Board theoretically represents the interests 
of the neighbors and may approve or disapprove of the proposed project before 
elected officials determine whether to grant the final approvals.  ULURP provides 
community stakeholders with an outlet to express their opinions about a project but 
gives the community little to no dispositive power. ULURP entrenches the imbalance 
of power between the developer, local government and neighbors. The developer 
has the power to initiate and persuade. The neighbors also have the power to 
persuade but cannot veto anything the developer requests. The local government 
has the authority to grant the developer’s requests but only limited authority to 
demand certain benefits in return for the general public or the neighbors.  In 
addition to ULURP, land use negotiations in New York unfold in a variety of legal 
                                                        
9  NYC DCP website,“The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure”; 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (Accessed March 2013) 
10 NYC DCP website,“The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure”; 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (Accessed March 2013). The ULURP 
process informally begins whenever the developer begins to discuss the proposed project with local 
government officials and community stakeholders. These informal discussions are precursors to and 
can occur simultaneously with negotiations for the CBA. 
11 See New York City Mayor’s Community Affairs Unit website, “About Community Boards” 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/cb/about.shtml (Accessed March 2013) 
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transactions and documents including development agreements, restrictive 
declarations and CBAs. 
c. CBAs, a new zoning-related legal tool, shifts the imbalance in the dynamic  
 
Community Benefits Agreements are one of the newest forms for capturing 
benefits for neighbors that are otherwise unattainable through the formal land use 
process. Agreements between developers and the community or local government 
to compensate for the impacts of the development are not new or unique. However 
“CBAs in their current form arose within a specific contemporary context.”12 
Benefits agreements are sometimes formalized in development agreements or 
restrictive declarations.  A development agreement is an agreement between the 
developer and the local government memorializing the land use and zoning 
regulations in effect at the time and any impacts the developer is agreeing to 
mitigate. A restrictive declaration is a covenant running with the land that prohibits 
the developer and future owners from using the land for a prohibited use.  These 
contracts provide a local government with the limited opportunity to contract for 
impact mitigation.  According to the City Bar Report, CBAs are the result of “a long 
history of negotiations among developers, land use authorities and public officials, 
and the affected community and various stakeholder groups (such as environmental 
groups or organized labor) over developer proposals that require governmental 
approval.”13  
                                                        
12 Laura Wolf-Powers, "Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government: A Review of Recent 
Evidence" Journal of the American Planning Association (2010) Vol. 76, No.2, 2 (finding that CBAs are 
the result of a strong urban real estate market interested in redevelopment and infill.) 
13 Association of the Bar of the City of New York Land Use Committee, The Role of Community Benefits 
Agreements in New York City’s Land Use Process, March 2010, 1. 
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Over the past decade, CBAs have become a popular tool in New York City for 
circumventing City Charter processes to mediate between community and 
developer interests.14 CBAs are symptomatic of the City’s unresponsive land use 
approval system and the community’s deep dissatisfaction with its role in the 
planning process. According to the New York City Charter Revision Commission 
“CBA supporters argue that the normal land use process does not allow for enough 
input by community members, and that CBAs provide a better forum for citizens to 
procure what they need from developers, resulting in a strengthening of the local 
economy and improvement of the neighborhood.” 15 CBAs enable the community to 
demand and receive benefits that are otherwise unattainable through ULURP and 
thereby shift the power in the tripartite stakeholder dynamic.  
d. Public and private CBAs raise different legal issues 
 
CBAs are unregulated contracts in an otherwise highly regulated area of 
municipal law, and therefore raise certain constitutional legal issues.  CBAs are 
either public or private agreements.  A private CBA is a contract between the 
developer and the community. CBAs are generally private agreements.16 A public 
CBA is a CBA in which the local government is involved. The City Bar Report found 
                                                        
14 For example - On May 18th 2009 Columbia University and the West Harlem Local Development 
Corporation (“WHLDC”) entered into the West Harlem Community Benefit Agreement (“WHCBA”). 
Columbia University, as developer, provided $150 million in cash and in-kind benefits for the West 
Harlem community in exchange for the community’s support of their proposed Manhattanville 
campus expansion. “West Harlem Community Benefits Agreement”, May 18, 2009 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/gca/news/COmmunityBenefitsAgreement/index.html (accessed 
March 2013) 
15 See New York City Charter Revision Commission, Final Report of the 2010 New York City Charter 
Revision Commission, August 23, 2010, 104.  (accessed March 2013)   
16 NYCBA, Report, 2. “CBAs are generally private agreements that detail the benefits a developer will 
provide in order to secure the cooperation, at least forbearance, of community organizations 
regarding the developer’s application for permission to develop a particular project.” 
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that in some instances “local governments incorporate the agreement (or its terms) 
into their own development agreements with the property owner.”17   
As a public agreement, a CBA is governed not only by contract law (which 
governs private agreements) but also by applicable federal, state and local laws that 
regulate actions of local governments. The most pressing public CBA legal constraint 
is the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its analogous 
provision in the New York State Constitution. The Fifth Amendment protects 
citizens from the government taking private property without just compensation. 
There are two types of takings. A physical taking can occur when the government 
physically takes or invades a private party’s property. A regulatory taking can occur 
when regulations are so burdensome that they effectively make it impossible for the 
party to enjoy the property. Courts are wary of local governments engaging in 
regulatory takings by abusing their authority to grant discretionary land use 
approvals as a mechanism for exacting cash and other benefits from developers 
seeking approvals. The Supreme Court since Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission18 in 1987 and Dolan v. Tigard19 in 1994 has construed the Takings 
Clause expansively, finding that a local government’s overly burdensome demands 
on developers in return for land use approvals is an impermissible regulatory 
takings.  
In a public CBA, Nollan/Dolan scrutiny would be triggered if the CBA were 
structured such that the local government (either directly or indirectly) demanded 
                                                        
17 NYCBA, Report, 3. (referring to the Staples CBA, did not provide a NYC example). 
18 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
19 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) 
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benefits in return for granting the land use approvals to the developer. Nollan/Dolan 
scrutiny is not triggered in private CBAs because the Takings Clause does not apply 
to purely private agreements. The Takings Clause does not apply in purely private 
CBAs because in such instances the government has not taken a regulatory action 
that deprives either party of property.  
e. Plan of the thesis 
 
Part I of this thesis introduces Community Benefits Agreements and outlines the 
research agenda to identify the legal constraints of Community Benefits 
Agreements. Part II, a literature review, assesses the current legal and planning CBA 
scholarship, finding that there is a divergence between the approach of each 
discipline to understanding the legal and stakeholder dynamics that structure a 
CBA.  Part III presents the research design and resources used to examine the legal 
constraints of CBAs. Part IV analyzes the potential legal issues in three New York 
City CBAs and finds that communities can pursue multiple strategies to negotiate 
valid CBAs. Part V concludes the thesis with recommendations for community 
organizations that are negotiating CBAs.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Over the past decade, CBAs have become increasingly used in the United 
States as an additional or alternative negotiation mechanism between community 
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stakeholders and real estate developers.  Since Julian Gross’20 work with the Staples 
Center CBA in 2001, academics and community organizers have recognized the rise 
in CBAs and their evolution from other forms of agreements (such as development 
agreements and restrictive declarations) providing benefits to neighbors or local 
government to mitigate the impacts of development. 21   
Scholars are also aware that CBAs as a legal form are a recent innovation, and 
therefore, definitive conclusions or comprehensive empirical studies are not yet 
available. The New York City Bar Association Report (City Bar Report) found that 
“[b]ecause most CBAs are relatively new, there is scant evidence, either empirical or 
anecdotal, to evaluate whether CBAs are a net benefit to the parties who enter into 
these agreements... Nor is it yet clear what effect CBAs will have on the land use 
process or the City’s development climate more generally.”22 CBA scholarship has 
focused on case studies and identifying potential legal issues.  Scholars are studying 
CBAs as they are negotiated and implemented (or fail to be signed) to offer 
community activists, local governments and developers practical insights in how to 
structure CBAs.   
Even though CBAs are relatively new, it is not too early in their development 
to assess the legal constraints of such agreements. The City Bar Report and other 
legal articles have addressed the regulatory and constitutional issues facing CBAs, 
contextualizing CBAs within “a long history of efforts by communities, developers 
                                                        
20 Julian Gross is the Legal Director of the California Partnership for Working Families. Although he is 
a lawyer for the purposes of this section I consider him a ‘planning scholar/planner’ because his 
work is focused on CBA organizing rather than CBA legal analysis and he co-authors articles with 
non-lawyers. 
21 See Wolf-Powers, Evidence. 
22 NYCBA, Report, 1-2. 
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and local governments to find flexible laws to address neighbors’ concerns about 
development proposals.”23 Many articles find that CBAs perpetuate rather than 
resolve the legal uncertainties of negotiating with developers to mitigate the 
impacts of development projects. While it is impossible to entirely resolve legal 
uncertainties before a court issues a conclusive ruling, this thesis hopes to untangle 
and clarify some parameters of the unresolved legal issues.  
a. CBAs suffer from a lack of definition 
 
The first step toward resolving legal uncertainty is properly defining the issue.  
Scholars have struggled to define the legal issues associated with CBAs because, as 
Dan Steinberg, a planning scholar focusing on labor involvement in CBAs notes, 
CBAs suffer from a lack of a formal definition.24 This deficiency rises in part from the 
relative novelty of CBAs but also because scholars disagree. To some extent, all CBA, 
planning and legal scholars alike, concur that CBAs are agreements between 
developers and community representatives for benefits from the developer in 
return for the community’s forbearance from protesting the project. They take 
different approaches however, to whether CBAs are limited to private agreements, 
what the community is actually giving to the real estate developer in the CBA, and 
whether certain actions of a local government constitute involvement in the 
agreement.  
Failing to identify and understand the legal ramifications of these issues puts 
community activists at risk of entering into CBAs that are legally unsound and 
                                                        
23 NYCBA, Report, 2. 
24 Interview with Dan Steinberg on February 21, 2013. 
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therefore enforceable. The community, even more than the developer, needs to 
ensure that the CBA is legally enforceable, since the parties to the CBA exchange 
their consideration at different time intervals. The community forbears from 
protesting the land use application at the beginning of the land use approval 
process. The developer, however, most often carries out its end of the bargain at a 
later date, during the actual construction process, or after construction is 
completed. Therefore, the developer receives its benefit up front, while the 
community must rely on the enforceability of the CBA to ensure that the developer 
meets its obligations at a later date. Scholars (other than Julian Gross) have failed to 
focus on providing communities with strategic protections from the inherent 
imbalance in the agreement. 
b. CBAs are a catchall for a variety of different kinds of agreements  
 
The disagreement among scholars as to CBAs’ definition has led to CBAs to 
become a catchall for a variety of different agreements that are fundamentally 
different. As CBAs evolve, the variations between CBAs will become more distinct 
and possibly develop into different legal forms. Over time a more refined definition 
of CBAs will also emerge. Until then, Laura Wolf-Powers’ 2009 typology 
demonstrates the range of agreements that scholars consider CBAs. She identified 
five general categories of CBAs:  
[1] Independent agreement between developer and negotiating parties (no 
formal government role); [2] Independent agreement exists between developer and 
negotiating parties (provisions also included in development and disposition 
agreement with redevelopment agency); [3] No independent agreement exists 
between negotiating parties and developer (but provisions included in development 
and disposition agreement with redevelopment agency); [4] Agreement exists 
between public or quasi-public agency or authority and negotiating parties (agency 
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or authority acting as developer); [5] Local legislation dictates benefits 
requirements25 
 
 This thesis considers only the first two types of agreements described above 
as CBAs. Wolf-Powers’ third type of agreement is not a CBA because in order to 
distinguish a CBA from other types of benefit agreements, a CBA must be an 
independent agreement between the developer and the community.26  When the 
local government acts as the developer, as described in Wolf-Powers’ fourth type of 
agreement, the tripartite stakeholder dynamic is fundamentally disrupted, and 
therefore, this type of agreement does not belong in the same analysis as a CBA 
between a private actor27 developer and a community. When the benefits are 
dictated by legislation, as described in Wolf-Powers’ fifth type of agreement, then 
the agreement cannot be considered voluntary.  The benefits resulting from 
legislation are not the product of a community negotiating for benefits otherwise 
unattainable. As defined earlier, CBAs are agreements between developers and 
communities for benefits that the developer would not otherwise provide. If 
communities are not party to the agreement (either as signatories or negotiating 
parties) the agreement should not be called a community benefit agreement.  
Wolf-Powers’ typology focuses on the parties to the agreement without 
analyzing why the agreement was made. This thesis categorizes CBAs differently. 
Instead of categorizing them by the nature of local government’s role, I posit that the 
                                                        
25 Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 4.  
26 A CBA can also become incorporated into a local government’s agreements and still be considered 
a CBA as long as it also exists as an independent agreement between the developer and the 
community. 
27 I am using the term private actor developer because public institutions can be private actor 
developers even though they are public organizations but a governmental organization can never 
truly be a private actor. 
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fundamental defining characteristic is the CBA’s subject matter. CBAs, as categorized 
by their subject matter, fall into two categories: (i) economic development and (ii) 
land use. Identifying the subject matter of the CBA is a critical first step in analyzing 
the CBA and developing a strategy for negotiations, because the legal constraints of 
contracting for a land use approval are different than the constraints of contracting 
for an economic development project. However as Wolf-Powers has stated28, it can 
be quite difficult to distinguish between the two types. To complicate matters 
further, the larger the redevelopment project the greater the likelihood it will 
require both land use approvals and economic development incentive packages 
from the local government resulting in a hybrid land use/economic development 
project.   
Once the subject matter is defined then the categorization should be further 
refined by the level of the local government’s involvement in drafting, negotiating, 
signing and/or enforcing the CBA. Wolf-Powers’ heuristic delineating between 
formal or informal government involvement fails to capture the nuances that a court 
would focus on when determining if local government were involved.  Properly 
identifying the extent of local government’s involvement becomes critically 
important for land use CBAs and for CBAs signed for deals that are hybrid land use 
and economic development.  Local government has greater legal leeway to become 
involved in economic development CBAs than in land use CBAs. If the subject matter 
of a CBA in a hybrid land use and economic development deal is unclear and the 
local government acting on that uncertainty becomes involved to an extent 
                                                        
28 Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 3.  
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permissible for an economic development CBA but impermissible for a land use 
CBA, it runs the risk of engaging in a regulatory taking that violates the Taking 
Clause. 
c. Planners and lawyers analyze CBAs from different perspectives  
 
Planning and legal scholars diverge on how they perceive the power 
dynamics between CBA stakeholders. These two disciplines understand the role that 
local government and neighbors play in land use differently. Lawyers view the role 
of local government as that of an impartial arbiter refereeing competing land use 
interests. Planners view local government as an active participant in shaping land 
use and distributing benefits and impacts of development.29 Lawyers view 
neighbors as a self-interested subset of the general public who will use their vote 
and political capital to preserve the status quo and the value of their property. 
Planners view neighbors as the subset of the general public most impacted by the 
project.  The divergence between planners and lawyers in perceiving the roles and 
values of the local government and the neighbors leads to fundamentally different 
outlooks on the validity and usefulness of CBAs.  
Planning scholars assume that the local government and neighbors are (or 
should be) pursuing similar goals.30 They present local government in the role of 
                                                        
29 See Julian Gross, with Greg LeRoy and Madeline Janis-Aparicio, “Good Jobs First, Community 
benefits agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable” 2005, 5. 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/cba2005final.pdf.  (“As local governments grapple with their 
responsibility to shape development and land use patterns, a new movement has emerged to 
challenge conventional thinking and offer a broader vision.”) 
30 Wolf-Powers, Evidence. 
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‘facilitator’31 whereas legal analysts view local government as ‘regulators’.  Planners 
view CBAs as empowering neighbors to participate more actively in the negotiation 
for the benefits that the local government had historically sought for them. Wolf-
Powers argues that “the parties to a CBA are not simply the groups seeking benefits 
and the developers from whom the benefits are being sought, but also the local 
public sector aiming to negotiate the best redevelopment deal for the locality.”32  
Planning scholars tend to focus on how to make developers accountable for the 
impacts of their projects.33 The planning approach pits local government and 
neighbors against developers. Planners do not perceive local government and 
neighbors as distinct stakeholders. When planners conflate these two roles in their 
CBA research and subsequent community organizing guides, communities are at 
risk of becoming misinformed about unnecessarily triggering legal constraints that 
are otherwise avoidable by community organizations capable of conducting their 
own negotiations.  
In contrast, legal scholars tend to adhere more strictly to the conventional 
land use law model of the tripartite stakeholder dynamic.34 Adherence to this model 
enables them to cast neighbors as continuing their historical role of negotiating on 
behalf of their subset of the general public’s interest.  Vicki Been, an NYU land use 
                                                        
31 See Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 2005, 4. (“Unfortunately, public-private 
partnerships at the local level are being driven for the most part by the private sector…Local 
governments, eager to expand their tax based and presented with little meaningful information about 
the costs and benefits of their choices, often see their role as being limited to facilitating the visions 
and plans of developers – rather than facilitating a public vision and plan developed with the input of 
a wide range of stakeholders.”)  
32 Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 2.  
33 See Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 2005.  
34 See Michael Nadler,”The Constitutionality of Community Benefits Agreements: Addressing the 
Exactions Problem.” Urban Lawyer 43, 587, 588. (“In development projects, there are at least three 
interested parties: the developer…the municipal government…and the local community.”)for 
references to the developer- local government-neighbor model. 
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law professor, like other legal scholars, views the neighbors as the prime movers, 
describing CBAs as “the latest in a long line of tools neighbors have used to protect 
their neighborhood from the burdens of development.”35 This approach presents 
CBAs as an alternative avenue to channel the conflict between the developer and the 
neighbors, necessary because of local government’s failure to effectively mediate 
their interests. It does not necessarily blame government for this failure but rather 
assumes that courts have constrained government to such an extent that 
government lacks the flexibility to respond effectively.36   
In contrast to planners’ conflating the interest of the neighbors and local 
government, legal scholars run the opposite risk of viewing the interests of 
neighbors and local government as wholly distinct. In reality, the local government 
derives its authority from neighbors and neighbors derive their authority from the 
local government.37 For example, in New York City, the borough president, an 
elected local official, appoints the members of the Community Board. The 
Community Board officially represents the neighbors in ULURP. Legal scholars’ 
misperception of the neighbors as an autonomous and powerful entity wholly 
distinct from local government overestimates the neighbors’ capacity to negotiate, 
implement and enforce a CBA without local government’s assistance.  Legal 
scholars’ insistence that communities are capable of advocating for CBAs separately 
from local government is a narrative fiction possibly created to evade some of the 
                                                        
35 Been, Exactions, 1.  
36 See Been, Exactions, 5.  
37 In the tripartite stakeholder dynamic developers tend to be defined as outsiders with limited 
voting rights or representation in local government. Neighbors on the other hand are local residents 
who vote for the local government. The local government in turn legislates the neighbors’ 
involvement in land use.  
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more difficult legal constraints on CBAs created when local government becomes 
involved.  
d.  Planning scholars conflate land use and economic development CBAs 
 
CBA activists have already begun to put together guides for assisting 
community organizations to advocate and negotiate for CBAs.38 However these 
guides tend to gloss over the legally crucial distinction between land use CBAs and 
economic development CBAs. While this distinction may be irrelevant in many 
projects, because a large project will usually need both land use approvals and 
subsidies, failing to make this distinction may lead community activists to believe 
they have more leverage than they do or link their benefits to the wrong impacts. In 
conflating these types of CBAs and failing to clearly demonstrate to community 
activists that public and private CBAs have different legal limitations, CBA scholar 
activists risk facilitating community organizing around unachievable or 
unenforceable benefits. For example, Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio explain that 
“community groups promise to support the proposed project before government 
bodies that provide the necessary permits and subsidies.”39 They later “strongly 
recommend that a CBA be incorporated into any [emphasis added] development 
agreement for a project, so that the CBA becomes enforceable by the government 
entity that is subsidizing the development.”40 On a close reading it is clear that their 
recommendation is limited to projects with government subsidies. However, 
                                                        
38 See Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First. 
 
39 Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 9. 
40 Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 10.  (This section is titled “How Does a CBA Relate 
to a Development Agreement”). 
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appreciating that limitation requires the ability to distinguish between permits and 
subsidies. The distinction especially in large-scale redevelopment projects can be 
murky.  Planning scholars often conflate a community’s source of bargaining power.  
e. Legal scholars are too focused on Takings Clause constraints  
 
Nadler identified whether CBAs violate the Takings Clause as “one of the 
most pressing and commonly cited” issues regarding CBAs.41  As part of their 
Takings Clause analysis, CBAs scholars debate whether Nollan/Dolan’s two-prong 
test would apply.42 Legal commentators focus on Nollan/Dolan because it is the 
most relevant, pressing and current Regulatory Takings case law. Nadler, like other 
legal scholars, agrees that if local government becomes “sufficiently involved in the 
CBA negotiation process, Nollan and Dolan should apply. In practice, this would lead 
to the invalidation of many promised community benefits contained in existing 
CBAs.”43 While much of the legal analysis of CBAs has focused on Nollan/Dolan,  
legal scholars should also begin considering legitimate contract law issues raised by 
CBAs, such as consideration and standing.  
The singular focus on Nollan/Dolan can obscure the reality that CBAs are not 
exactions.  Exactions are “conditions that a local government imposes on a 
developer in return for the local government agreeing to allow a land use that it 
otherwise could prohibit. Exactions are a means of ensuring that developers, rather 
than taxpayers, bear the costs and risks of development…and mitigate any harmful 
                                                        
41 See Nadler, Constitutionality, 587. 
42 Nadler, Constitutionality, 587. 
43 Nadler, Constitutionality, 587. 
 24 
consequences of development.”44   When an exaction violates the Taking Clause, it 
becomes a regulatory taking. Unlike the exactions discussed in Nollan and Dolan, 
CBAs are not a prerequisite for land use approvals. CBAs may become public 
agreements, but are not necessarily public by definition. Legal scholars often 
dismiss the analysis of which circumstances and characteristics (short of 
incorporation into a development agreement between the developer and the local 
government), would make the local government ‘sufficiently involved’ to warrant 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.  
Legal scholars often mistakenly assume that  that community activists are 
aware of and concerned about Nollan/Dolan constraints. For example, in Been’s 
discussion of why CBAs are attractive to communities, she stated that “CBAs allow 
neighborhoods to negotiate their own mitigation and benefits without having to 
worry about the Nollan-Dolan nexus and proportionality requirements, which might 
apply if the city were involved in the negotiations.”45 I have been unable to find any 
anecdotal evidence that demonstrates that negotiating parties are concerned about 
whether the courts would consider the benefits to be improper regulatory takings. 
In fact when I interviewed a former lawyer about her role in negotiating a NYC CBA, 
she said that Nollan/Dolan constraints were not a concern because CBAs are just 
another iteration of frequently-used side agreements between developers and 
neighbors. Another lawyer who represents developers in CBA negotiations told me 
during an informal conversation that he does not know of community organizations 
that are aware of or feel constrained by Nollan/Dolan. 
                                                        
44 Been, Exactions, 6. 
45 Been, Exactions, 8. 
 25 
Legal scholars have failed to offer guidelines to community activists and local 
governments to avoid Nollan/Dolan scrutiny when negotiating CBAs. Even though 
community organizations seem unconcerned about the Taking Clause constraints, 
legal scholars should provide clear information about the legal practicalities of these 
agreements because CBAs are ripe for legal challenges by developers disinterested 
in providing the benefits in this economic downturn or future purchasers of the 
development disinterested in implementing the developer’s promises. As CBAs 
develop into a more entrenched legal form or as the projects associated with CBAs 
age, affiliated parties are going to become disenchanted with the CBA negotiation or 
implementation process and legally challenge the CBAs enforceability.   
f. Bridging Legal and Planning Literature 
 
 This thesis will bridge the gap between planning’s disinterest with 
distinguishing between public and private agreements (and the associated legal 
constraints) and land use and economic development CBAs and law’s singular focus 
on the constitutional issues. The thesis reconciles these two strains by arguing that 
community activists must choose a public, private or hybrid approach to CBA 
negotiation. The public/private distinction is key to understanding CBAs, but it is 
also critical to recognize that the public/private distinction is more accurately a 
continuum, and therefore, the legal constraints vary in subtle ways as the CBAs 
become more public or more private.   
III. Research Design 
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In order to understand the legal constraints faced by neighbors interested in 
engaging in CBAs, I researched the legal and planning scholarship on CBAs.  CBAs 
are a new and distinct legal instrument, and therefore, a dearth of empirical and, to 
some extent, anecdotal evidence exists.46 Moreover, the limited scholarship on CBAs 
and the lack of case law have made it difficult to assess the success of existing CBAs. 
I therefore focused this thesis on the legal issues surrounding advocating, 
negotiating and implementing CBAs, instead of tcompiling best practices for drafting 
a legally valid CBA. 
 The evidence I gathered fell into four primary categories: primary research, 
legal scholarship, planning scholarship and media coverage.  The primary research 
consisted of copies of Community Benefits Agreements I found on the internet and 
cases I pulled from Lexis Nexis. The legal scholarship included legal journal articles 
and professional association reports. The planning scholarship included practical 
guides to CBA organizing and planning journal articles. I also gathered newspaper 
articles about CBAs and conducted informal and formal interviews with people 
involved in existing CBAs.  
 First, I researched the various kinds of CBAs in existence and came to the 
conclusion that CBAs derived from developers seeking land use approvals have 
fundamentally different legal issues than CBAs derived from developers receiving 
subsidies and land dispositions from the local government. I then narrowed my 
research to the legal issues of land use CBAs because the research showed that 
economic development CBAs would only raise contract law legal issues whereas 
                                                        
46 NYCBA, Report. 
 27 
land use CBAs would raise the same contract law issues but also possible 
constitutional issues. 
I began by contextualizing CBAs within the larger framework of land use 
decision-making. I researched how the tripartite stakeholder dynamic has evolved 
to include proto-CBA forms of negotiation and benefit agreements.47 It became clear 
that the legal scholarship and the planning scholarship approached the tripartite 
stakeholders dynamic differently. I continued researching both planning and legal 
perspectives on CBAs with the intention of reconciling their approaches. 
The planners tended to focus on how to organize the community and ensure 
certain kinds of benefits. The lawyers were focused on whether CBAs were valid 
legal agreements and how they fit in with current land use jurisprudence concerned 
with regulatory takings. I had begun my research distracted by the legal approach. 
Initially, I wanted this thesis to answer the question of how community organizers 
could reconcile the Nollan/Dolan constraints when negotiating CBAs. As I 
researched existing CBA processes and spoke with CBA participants48 it became 
clear that CBA ‘practitioners’ were not hamstrung by Nollan/Dolan because they 
were either unaware or indifferent to the case law.  
These realizations crystallized the idea that the most useful part of this thesis 
would be to bridge the legal and planning literature and provide practitioners with 
distilled, practical analysis of the possible pitfalls associated with different CBA 
negotiating and implementation strategies. Understanding the practical legal 
                                                        
47  Wolf-Powers, Evidence.  
48 Interviews with Dan Steinberg, Michael Nadler, and confidential conversations with land use 
lawyers negotiating CBAs in New York City.  
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constraints would allow the communities to use their resources more effectively – 
negotiate for valid benefits and avoid or succeed in litigation.  
With this refined research goal in mind I continued to research the relevant case 
law. The case law is not entirely on point. As far as I and other researchers have 
found, CBAs have yet to be challenged in court.49 Legal analysis has primarily 
focused on Nollan and Dolan, the two Supreme Court cases limiting local 
government’s ability to demand exactions in return for land use approvals. Since the 
Supreme Court does not often review zoning or land use issues, these cases are the 
launching point of legal analysis for innovations in land use and zoning. I included 
these two seminal cases in my analysis of public and private agreements. I also 
expanded my research to cases covering neighbor consent provisions and state 
action doctrine. Neighbor consent provisions, or legislative requirements for 
neighbor consent of a particular land use, have been largely ignored by CBA 
scholars.  Been discusses them briefly in a few footnotes.50 This thesis included it 
because it could further illuminate why the distinction between public and private 
agreements is so crucial.  
Another understudied CBA legal issue is the State Action Doctrine that provides 
individuals with constitutional protections from the state but does not extend these 
protections to actions by one individual to another. The State Action Doctrine is the 
source for determining that courts will treat private and public CBAs differently.  
Michael Nadler provided a thorough analysis of State Action Doctrine even though 
                                                        
49 Patricia Salkin, “Understanding Community benefits agreements: Opportunities and Traps for 
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations.” (October 29, 2007).  Touro College – 
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center   
50 See Been, Exactions, 1.  
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others ignored it.51 Analysis of the State Action Doctrine is crucial for discovering 
what characteristics a court might focus on when determining whether a CBA is 
public or private. It is important for CBA practitioners to understand the 
consequences of involving local government or elected officials. 
The results of my interviews bore out what I was beginning to sense from the 
literature. I interviewed Dan Steinberg, a PhD candidate working on how to make 
development accountable; Michael Nadler, a lawyer who worked on the New York 
City Bar Association Report and wrote a law journal article on the constitutional 
issues of CBAs; and a former lawyer heavily involved in the Columbia CBA. My 
interviews were open-ended conversation guided by pre-drafted questions. I 
focused my questions on their understanding of the legal constraints, what they 
perceived to be community CBA activists’ perception of the legal constraints and 
how the legal constraints factored into negotiations with developers and local 
government. I also spoke informally to lawyers at City Bar meetings who have or are 
currently negotiating CBAs in New York City. They did not want to participate in 
formal interviews because of sensitivity to their clients. 
 The interviewees, all from different backgrounds and perspectives, felt that, in 
their experience, community activists were not consciously constrained by 
Nollan/Dolan. Community organizations did not shape or limit their benefit requests 
based on Nollan/Dolan’s essential-nexus/roughly-proportionate tests.  They were 
less concerned about how a court might react to the benefits and more focused on 
                                                        
51 Nadler, Constitutionality. 
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putting an agreement together and figuring out if the local government would 
enforce it.  
IV. Legal Analysis  
 
 In 2001, the developers of the Staples Center in Los Angeles and the 
Figuoeroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice entered into the first CBA, known 
as the Staples CBA.52 The Staples CBA covers a wide range of benefits from living 
wage and employment provisions to funding for parks and affordable housing.53 In 
2005 the developer began to implement the CBA.54 The Atlantic Yards CBA, New 
York City’s first CBA was also signed in 2005.55 Columbia University entered into a 
CBA with the West Harlem community in 2009.56 Not all CBA negotiations have led 
to a signed CBA, most notably the Related Companies and the Kingsbridge Armory 
Redevelopment Alliance failed to sign a CBA in 2006. 
The complexity and confusion surrounding the legal constraints of who may 
participate in CBAs and CBA’s role in New York’s land use process has impeded 
CBAs’ success in becoming a stabilizing factor in the contested tripartite stakeholder 
dynamic. If and when CBAs’ legal status either as a public and/or private agreement 
becomes validated, communities and developers can standardize their negotiating 
procedure in such a way that will relieve some of the pressure from the unstable 
tripartite stakeholder dynamic.  
                                                        
52 NYCBA. Report.   
53 Gross, LeRoy and  Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 30-31and 35. 
54 Gross, LeRoy and  Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, p.30. 
55 NYCBA, Report. 
56 “West Harlem Community Benefits Agreement”, (May 18, 2009) 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/gca/news/COmmunityBenefitsAgreement/index.html (accessed 
March 2013)  
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Gross, an early CBA activist, defines CBAs as “a legally enforceable contract, 
signed by community groups and by a developer, setting forth a range of community 
benefits that the developer agrees to provide as part of the development project.”57 
His definition does not require local government involvement. Generally CBAs are 
private third-party agreements between the developer and the community, and 
therefore the local government is not a party to the agreement and has no standing 
in court to enforce the agreement. However if the local government memorializes 
the agreements as part of a development agreement or restrictive declaration the 
local government then gains standing. 58  
The rise of CBAs is premised on the dynamic that the community can and will 
represent its own interests to negotiate for compensation for the direct impact of 
the development on their community. The community is a third voice that is not 
always represented by the local government because these interests may conflict 
with the local government’s larger view of the development and/or because the 
local government does not have the authority to capture these benefits for the 
community. Laura Wolf-Powers believes that “[i]n the ideal case, public sector 
officials receive input from affected community members during the land use and 
development review process and proceed to carry the public’s priorities and 
concerns into negotiations with private developers.”59 However this view of the land 
use dynamic subsumes the community into the greater public sector. That view 
conflicts with the tri-partite dynamic that the neighbors are a self-interested subset 
                                                        
57 Gross, LeRoy and  Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 9. 
58 See Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 9-10. 
59 Wolf-Powers, Evidence.  
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disinterested in conducting the larger scale cost-benefit analysis appropriate of local 
government. Viewing CBAs as the failure of local government to consider the input 
of affected community members misses the inherent potential tension between the 
demands of the community and the demands of the local government on a 
developer. The community’s demands are not demands meant to mitigate the larger 
impacts of the development but demands to compensate a community for 
forbearing from using their elevated position as neighbors to delay or derail the 
development.  Since the development impacts neighbors differently than it does the 
general public the neighbors represent the public’s interest on a smaller more self-
interested scale than the local government.  
In New York City, defining the geographic scale of the impacted community is 
complicated because the Community Board, Borough President and the City Council 
each represent different but overlapping affected communities. A project might 
cross the borders of a few Community Boards or affect a small area of a 
geographically large Community Board. ULURP maintains the distinct identity of the 
neighbors as a subset of the general public by providing the affected Community 
Board with a role in the process. ULURP also enables the general public to 
participate through public hearings and by lobbying their borough president and 
local city councilmen. New York City is also unique in its manifestation of the 
tripartite stakeholder dynamic because in New York real estate developers of large-
scale projects tend to be repeat players in a pro-development real estate 
environment.  
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Although New York City has not yet included a CBA in one of its development 
agreements or restrictive declarations with a developer, the Bar Association found 
that “[i]n a few recent cases in New York City, local government officials have 
participated in the negotiations or signed the agreement as witnesses.”60 Laura 
Wolf-Powers also found that local government participates more directly in CBAs 
than acknowledged.61 When local government officials participate in the 
negotiations or act as witnesses to agreements not otherwise incorporated into 
agreements between the local government and the developer, the agreement 
remains a private agreement but begins to take on public characteristics that may 
lead courts (and the public) to demand that these agreements are treated as if they 
are public. 
a. CBA Legal Issues 
 
CBAs as unregulated agreements raise several interconnected legal issues. 
Since courts have not ruled on the legality or enforceability of any CBAs yet, it is 
difficult to determine exactly which aspects of a CBA will draw the court’s attention. 
Potential legal issues include: whether the CBA is a valid contract; whether the local 
government has overstepped its authority in participating in CBA negotiations; 
whether the local government may condition a land use approval on the signing of a 
CBA and whether a CBA’s mere existence in consideration for a land use approval 
has caused the local government to engage in a regulatory taking. It is also difficult 
                                                        
60 NYCBA, Report, 3 
61 Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 2.  (“[a]t its simplest, a CBA is a legal contract between a developer and a 
set of nongovernmental groups whose support the developer considers necessary to obtain key 
public approvals or subsidies. However, most such arrangements involve local government actors 
much more directly than this suggests.”) 
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to predict whether these first CBA cases will be brought by the developer, the 
community, a successor-in-interest to the developer, a successor community 
organization, the local government or some other party. A court may not grant all 
these potential challengers standing.   
b. Nollan/Dolan constraints 
 
Legal scholars believe that whether CBAs violate the Takings Clause is the most 
pressing issued facing CBAs.62 In determining this, legal scholars turn to 
Nollan/Dolan jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has developed a two-prong test for 
determining if local government’s exactions, or demands on a developer, amount to 
a regulatory taking. The first prong derived from the ruling in Nollan “imposes a 
“nexus” requirement: the benefit the government seeks to exact from a developer 
must have an “essential nexus” to the legitimate state interest that the government 
would have invoked to justify rejecting the proposed development.”63 The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Dolan created the second prong – the ‘roughly proportional’ test. As 
a result of Dolan “the amount of the benefit the government seeks has to be roughly 
proportional to the impact that the particular development would impose.”64 
Together Nollan/Dolan require that exactions imposed on a developer by the local 
government have an ‘essential nexus’ to the development and are ‘roughly 
proportionate’ to the impacts of the development.  
                                                        
62 See Nadler, Constitutionality, 587.  
63 Been, Exactions, 6. (explaining the ruling in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
64  Been, Exactions, 6. (explaining the ruling in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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Nollan/Dolan’s limitations on exactions belong to a larger set of jurisprudence 
skeptical of how developers are treated by local government and neighbors. Earlier 
cases ruled against any zoning approvals that appeared contract-like until the courts 
began to accept the idea that zoning is not static but rather a structured negotiation 
between the developer and the local government.65 Courts are uncomfortable with 
local governments that have too much power over developers.  
While CBAs as side agreements might not raise the same concerns for courts as 
exactions required by local government, the courts are also concerned with 
neighbors controlling developers. One example of neighbors potentially controlling 
developers is when a municipality’s local land use law includes a ‘neighbor consent 
provisions’. These provisions usually call for a threshold of neighbors to consent to 
the developer’s requested land use. While there is little case law on these types of 
provisions, courts are generally wary of giving neighbors too much authority to 
control how developers use their property.66 Been describes neighbor consent 
provisions as “hav[ing] met with considerable skepticism, and the Supreme Court’s 
limited jurisprudence on neighbor’s consent provisions suggests that they are 
unconstitutional if neighbors are able to exercise unbridled discretion, at least if the 
proposed use is not a noxious one.”67  
Neighbor consent provisions differ from CBAs, because as a matter of local law, 
neighbor consent provisions legislatively require that the neighbors consent before 
the local government will grant an approval. CBAs are not initiated or required by 
                                                        
65 See Been, Exactions.  
66 See Been, Exactions, 7. 
67 See Been, Exactions, 7.; fn 51 referring to Seattle Title Trust v Roberge, 278 US 116, 120-22 (1928) 
and Eubank v City of Richmond, 226 US 137, 140-44 (1912). 
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legislation. Neighbor consent provisions upend the tripartite stakeholder dynamic 
by giving neighbors a dispositive vote that they do not possess in many zoning 
regimes, including ULURP. Courts disfavor these provisions because they have the 
power to erode developer’s property protections. CBAs do not fundamentally 
restructure the dynamic in the way that the provisions do. CBAs are private 
voluntary agreements that provide both the developers and community with 
material benefits. Developers benefit from CBAs because they theoretically make it 
easier for a developer to gain an approval from the local government because the 
local government is assured by the existence of the CBA that the neighbors approve 
(or do not protest) the development. Private CBAs in no way guarantee that the 
developer will be granted the approval from the local government.  
Neighbor consent provisions shift the balance of the dynamic because they 
procedurally require neighbor consent for developers to gain the sought-after 
approval. The courts’ treatment of neighbor consent provisions provide a useful 
outer limit to how much power the courts will allow neighbors to gain. However 
neighbor consent provisions do not have a meaningful impact on structuring a CBA 
because CBAs are only used where neighbors lack the legislative authority to stop a 
development. CBAs are used where neighbors can prove to be a delaying and thus 
costly irritant but cannot stop the development in their own right.  
c. State Action Doctrine 
 
Another legal doctrine that has received little attention in CBA scholarship is the 
State Action Doctrine. The State Action Doctrine provides individuals with 
constitutional protections from state actions. The State Action Doctrine does not 
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extend the Bill of Rights protections to private actions by private non-governmental 
actors. Courts will use the State Action Doctrine to distinguish between the legal 
status of public and private CBAs. Applying the State Action Doctrine to CBA fact 
patterns is crucial for discovering what characteristics a court may focus on when 
determining whether a CBA is public or private.  
d. New York City Case Studies 
 
I used the CBAs from Atlantic Yards, Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion 
and Kingsbridge Armory as case studies for identifying potential legal issues. I chose 
these three because Atlantic Yards and Columbia’s expansion are two of the biggest 
projects in New York in recent years. They both required land use approvals. I 
included the Kingsbridge Armory even though the developer did not develop the 
project because its media coverage provides clear examples of local government 
involvement.68  
It should be noted that the New York City real estate development climate is 
unique due to the fact that a small group of real estate developers tend to be repeat 
players and work closely with a pro-development local government. This 
environment already shifts the traditional conception of the tripartite-stakeholder 
dynamic. In other municipalities neighbors may have more authority to delay or 
resist a project.  However New York City’s pro-development culture and ULURP’s 
weak provision of land use authority to neighbors provide neighbors with little 
bargaining power in the formal land use decision process. This has created a 
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demand for an alternative, informal negotiating process between the community 
and developers to mediate potential conflict.   
i. Atlantic Yards 
 
Atlantic Yards is a mixed-use redevelopment in Brooklyn. The project covers 
former rail yards and a residential area. When completed, the project will include 8 
million square feet of development.  The Barclays Center, the anchor of the 
development, opened in September 2012.  The development plan also calls for more 
than 6,000 residential units of which 2,250 are to be affordable.69  The project 
required land use approvals, public subsidies, and the use of eminent domain.70 The 
project, particularly its use of public funds and eminent domain, was highly 
contentious from the outset. 
The Atlantic Yards CBA was signed June 27, 2005 and is between the 
developer, Forest City Ratner, and a coalition of eight community organizations led 
by ACORN.71  The CBA provided four broad types of benefits:  job development, 
affordable housing, small business contracting and community amenities.  
The Atlantic Yards CBA, like the other New York City CBAs, exhibits 
characteristics of all four types of CBAs. It is a hybrid land use and economic 
development project. The CBA is solely between the developer and community 
organizations but local government was involved in some of the negotiations. Since 
                                                        
69 Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn website. http://dddb.net/php/aboutdddb.php (accessed March 
2013) and Eliot Brown, “Housing Pieces Delayed”. Wall Street Journal (March 28, 2013). 
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71 Atlantic Yards CBA, (June 27, 2005) http://www.scribd.com/doc/31432536/Atlantic-Yards-
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the Atlantic Yards CBA was not integrated into a development agreement or other 
similar document with the city or state, the Atlantic Yards CBA does not meet the 
most basic test for a public CBA.72  
Ideally the text of the CBA and any other legal document recording the legal 
terms of the CBA would define the subject matter of the CBA and the parties 
involved. The Atlantic Yards CBA is not so clear. According to the Atlantic Yards CBA, 
Forest City Ratner, was pursuing a project that contains both land use and economic 
development characteristics. Language hinting at the purpose of the project can be 
found in the Preamble and Definition sections.73  The CBA defines the “Term” of the 
CBA as “commenc[ing] on the date hereof and continue until either (i) the 
Developers abandon their efforts to acquire or lease from the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority and to obtain a rezoning of the Project site for large-scale 
development, or (ii) thirty (30) years from commencement of construction…”74 As a 
hybrid CBA, the Atlantic Yards CBA is constrained by land use law.  
The Atlantic Yards CBA, however, attempts to obscure the purpose of the 
CBA by limiting the consideration provided by the community organizations to their 
role in administering and implementing the agreed upon benefits.75 CBA scholars 
have noted that courts, in adhering to the Second Restatement of Contracts, 
generally only conduct a cursory investigation into the adequacy of the 
consideration.76 Courts may not challenge or look past this description of the 
                                                        
72 See Salkin, Understanding, 8. (“[t]he Atlantic Yards CBA is not incorporated into a development 
agreement with the city, making enforcement possibly more difficult”).  
73Atlantic Yards CBA, 1-2.  
74 Atlantic Yards CBA, 5. 
75 See Atlantic Yards CBA, 6-7. “B. Designation of Implementation Roles” 
76 Salkin, Understanding, 16. See 17A AM. Jur. 2d. Contracts §124.  
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consideration. If the courts accept this consideration at face value, the CBA appears 
to be entirely private. This consideration does not implicate land use/regulatory 
takings jurisprudence or the state action doctrine.  
The consideration described in the CBA does not provide the whole picture. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), attached in the Appendix to the CBA, 
between Forest City Ratner and ACORN sheds more light on what the community 
organizations are truly providing the developer. The MOU contains a list of 
provisions outlining the developer’s and ACORN responsibilities. Two of these 
provisions define ACORN’s responsibilities. According to the MOU, “2. ACORN agrees 
to assist the Developer in working with governmental authorities (including the 
Public Parties) in order to secure necessary modifications to existing affordable 
housing programs, and related rules and regulations [and] 3.…ACORN agrees to take 
reasonable steps to publicly support the Project by, among other things, appearing 
with the Developer before the Public Parties, community organizations and the 
media as part of a coordinate effort to realize and advance the Project and the 
contemplated creation of affordable housing.”77 Provision number two describes 
ACORN’s responsibility to cooperate with and assist the developer in implementing 
the agreed to housing program. Provision number three describes ACORN’s 
responsibilities to support the project in front of local governmental bodies 
including voting ULURP parties. This provision is characteristic of a land use CBA. If 
this provision had been in the body of the contract rather than the Appendix then 
the court would be more likely to view this as part of the consideration.   
                                                        
77 See Atlantic Yards CBA, Appendix, Exhibit D “Memorandum of Understanding”. 
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ii. Columbia’s Manhattanville Expansion  
 
In May 2009, Columbia University and the West Harlem Local Development 
Corporation (“WHLDC”) signed the “West Harlem Community Benefits 
Agreement”.78 The community was represented by the WHLDC which was made up 
of local community members, members from the Community Board, and 
representatives of local elected officials. Since signing the CBA, WHLDC has 
dissolved and reincorporated as the West Harlem Development Corporation 
(“WHDC”) successor organization.79 Many of the former WHLDC board members are 
WHDC board members.   
Columbia entered into the CBA for several reasons including intense lobbying 
to do so from local government officials. Columbia needed community support for 
its ULURP application for rezoning properties in Manhattanville for an extended 
campus. Moreover, Columbia was contending with Community Board 9, the local 
community board, which submitted its own competing rezoning 197-a plan.80 While 
efforts were made to reconcile the two plans, the CBA was the best solution for 
creating buy-in and agreement between the parties.  
The CBA was beneficial to both the community and Columbia. Columbia 
wanted to ensure that there would be no litigation from the community challenging 
their requested zoning approvals and wanted to obtain local officials’ approval. The 
community wanted to make sure that many of the benefits generated by the 
                                                        
78 West Harlem CBA. 
79 West Harlem Development Corporation Website. http://westharlemdc.org/about/ (accessed 
March 2013) 
80 NYCBA, Report, 18. According to the City Charter, a Community Board may submit its own plan for 
consideration and implementation by the City. Both plans went through ULURP at roughly the same 
time.  
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expansion would remain localized rather than simply accrue to Columbia and the 
City and the State.  
The CBA provides for a Benefits Fund of $76 million, an Affordable Housing 
Fund of $20 million, up to $4 million in legal services related to housing, $30 million 
for a community public school and $20 million in in-kind benefits.81 The agreement 
also provides for technical assistance and guidance from Columbia as well as 
internships, scholarships and other Columbia-related benefits. The agreement is 
structured such that any benefit that is provided for by agreements with the City 
and State are enforced and monitored through those government agreements. 
Benefits that are extraneous to the City agreements are enforced and monitored 
through the process set out in the CBA.82 The CBA clearly states that the 
consideration for the CBA is that no litigation “shall be commenced or pending.”83  
The CBA represents a conscious effort on the part of the developer and the 
City to create a two-tiered public and private CBA. Any benefit that the City felt 
justified in demanding because of the EIS report it could incorporate into its public 
documents. Any benefit that may be outside of the bounds of the City’s authority and 
might approach an impermissible taking was not backed by a City-led enforcement 
mechanism. This effort balances the legal concerns but raises the question of 
whether courts would respect this distinction or view the entire package as a back-
handed attempt at a regulatory taking. Between the City enforcement mechanism, 
the Mayor and the EDC providing the community with experienced legal 
                                                        
81 West Harlem CBA, 8. 
82 West Harlem CBA. 
83 West Harlem CBA, 8. 
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representation,84 the local official involvement with negotiating and 
administering,85 and the City Council and the Borough President approving the 
expansion as a result of the community agreeing to the CBA,86 the State Action 
Doctrine has clearly been triggered.  The Court would likely apply Nollan/Dolan 
analysis to this CBA if the developer would raise a regulatory taking challenge. 
However, practically, it seems unlikely that a public university interested in working 
with the City in the future would exert such a challenge. 
iii. Kingsbridge Armory  
 
In 2006, the City issued an RFP for developers to redevelop the vacant 
Kingsbridge Armory site in The Bronx.87 The Kingsbridge Armory redevelopment is 
an economic development project. The Related Companies was chosen in 2008 to 
redevelop the site into a 575,000 square foot mall and was to be granted $17 million 
in tax benefits from the City.88 The Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance 
(KARA) a coalition of labor, community and church organizations, represented the 
neighbors in the CBA negotiations. Julian Gross, who had successfully negotiated the 
Staples Center CBA, advised KARA during its negotiations.89 The community began 
the negotiations with little faith in Related because Related had just completed a 
                                                        
84 NYCBA, Report, 22. 
85 Hunter Walker. “City Officials, Others Quibble With Group Administering $100 Million of 
Columbia’s Cash.” New York Observer (November 22, 2011). http://www.observer.com/term/west-
harlem-local-development-corporation/ (accessed March 2013). 
86 See Been, Exactions,  fn 104. 
87 Robert Knakal, “Congrats, Kingsbridge Armory Opponents.” New York Observer (April 15, 2010). 
http://observer.com/2010/04/congrats-kingsbridge-armory-opponents/(accessed March 2013). 
88 Terry Pristin, “Bronx Groups Demand a Voice in a Landmark’s Revival” New York Times, (June 25, 
2008). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/business/25armory.html(accessed March 2013); 
Knakal, Congrats.  
89 Bill Egbert. “Negotiations over CBA for Kingsbridge Armory redevelopment” New York Daily News 
(April 28, 2008) http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/negotiations-cba-kingsbridge-
armory-redevelopment-article-1.278259#ixzz2PFBXaQW6 (accessed March 2013). 
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widely criticized Gateway CBA for the Gateway Mall in The Bronx. KARA wanted a 
CBA that “guaranteed specified wage and hiring standards for workers and tenants. 
The groups [were] also seeking athletic and recreational space, room for cultural 
programs and social services and opportunities for local entrepreneurs.”90 
In order to redevelop the site, the project needed ULURP approval and the 
City Council to vote in its favor. The City Council voted 45 to 1 against the project 
because Related would not agree to the CBA calling for living wages for employees 
of the future tenants of the site.91 
The Kingsbridge Armory CBA, had it been passed, would have triggered the State 
Action Doctrine because the Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz “draft[ed] a 
model CBA with KARA, the local community board and other elected officials.”92 
During ULURP, the Community Board voted to approve the project on the condition 
that the CBA was signed, and Borough President Diaz planned to withhold his 
approval until a CBA was signed.93 The community and Related could not agree to 
the terms of the CBA because of the living wage requirement. The City Council 
ultimately voted against the project with both the community and the developer 
attributing the vote to the failed CBA.94As the City considers a new developer for the 
site, the community is working on negotiating a new CBA.95 
                                                        
90 Pristin, Bronx Groups.  
91 Knakal, Congrats. 
92 Nadler, Constitutionality, 622. 
93 Nadler, Constitutionality, 622. 
94 Nadler, Constitutionality, 623. 
95 David Cruz, “CBA talks for Kingsbridge Armory Bid Underway.” Bronx Times (January 31, 2013). 
http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2013/5/05_armory_2013_01_31_bx.html (accessed March 2013). 
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 Given the Borough President’s and Community Board’s involvement with 
negotiating the CBA, the State Action Doctrine would have been triggered. If the 
court then applied Nollan/Dolan analysis, it is unlikely a living wage requirement 
imposed on tenants would have withheld an ‘essential-nexus’ challenge. Although 
the Kingsbridge Armory would have been an economic development project, since 
the CBA was being used to control the ULURP process, it took on land use 
constraints as well. Had the CBA been a requirement in the RFP and directly linked 
to the tax benefits provided by the City, this analysis would not apply. However the 
Borough President and the Community Board were not involved in the EDC’s RFP 
nor the IDA’s tax benefits and therefore had no authority to hinge the CBA 
negotiations on more legally sound conditions.  
V. Findings Chapter 
 
a. Categorizing CBAs 
 
Many different forms of legal agreements fall within the definition of 
Community Benefits Agreements.  Across the United States communities are 
entering into CBAs.96 These agreements vary by community, reflecting local land use 
regulations and local community bargaining power. Julian Gross would include any 
agreement “in which the developer agrees to shape the development in a certain 
way or to provide specified community benefits.97  The developer might be seeking 
a CBA either to earn a community’s support for land use approvals or subsidies. 
                                                        
96 See Tulane University’s Public Law Center, “The Summary and Index of Community Benefits 
Agreements.” http://www.law.tulane.edu/plc/ (accessed March 2013). 
97 Gross, LeRoy and Janis-Aparicio, Good Jobs First, 9. 
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Since land use CBAs and economic development CBAs have different legal 
constraints, it would be useful for community organizers (local government, the 
courts and developers) if CBA scholars used different labels to differentiate between 
these two agreements. When too many different types of agreements are included 
under the same rubric it makes it more difficult for already resource and capacity 
limited community organizers to understand the strategic considerations of 
pursuing the different forms of agreements (land use or economic development 
CBAs or public or private CBAs).  
As a practical matter, determining the subject matter of the CBA should be 
the threshold question into any inquiry attempting to define a CBA. This ‘subject 
matter’ test is the threshold question because it will determine the scope of legal 
constraints on the negotiating parties and the appropriateness of local government’s 
involvement.  For some projects, determining whether the developer is providing 
benefits for land use approvals or subsidies is clear, making this first line of inquiry 
a simple categorization task. Other projects will require both land use approvals and 
economic development subsidies. It may be more difficult to determine what kind of 
CBA a community entered into for these hybrid projects. In order to make a subject 
matter determination for a CBA associated with a hybrid project, the community 
should look to the consideration provided.  
After the subject matter determination has been made, the inquiry should 
proceed to determine the status of the agreement - whether the agreement is public 
or private. This status determination will further define the legal constraints. The 
subject matter should be identified first because if a CBA is solely for economic 
 47 
development project then even if the government required a CBA there is no risk of 
a court finding a regulatory taking because the local government is not acting in a 
regulatory capacity when entering into economic development agreements with a 
developer. Determining subject matter and status will structure the universe of 
legally valid potential benefits available to the community.  
 
CBA Inquiry Flowchart*: 
 
*For a hybrid project conduct both lines of inquiry and determine the subject matter of the CBA based on the consideration 
provided by the community.  
 
Unfortunately CBAs rarely adhere neatly to these distinctions. Most CBAs are 
hybrids, manifesting muddled subject matter and status characteristics. Although a 
project might require land use approvals and obtain economic development 
subsidies, the developer may seek the CBA for one or both aspects. Whenever a 
community provides land use approval consideration for the CBA, even if the 
community is also benefitting from and supporting the developer’s bid for subsidies, 
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a court will likely apply land use case law. Even though the court might look to land 
use cases, a CBA that is also an economic development CBA provides supporters of 
the CBA and the court with the opportunity to hinge the consideration on the 
subsidy as a mechanism for avoiding the stricter land use restrictions. Even though 
the distinctions are nebulous, the categories are useful for strategizing future CBAs 
and predicting their legal validity.  
b. Characteristics of Public and Private CBAs  
 
Legal CBA scholarship has become hyper-focused on assessing the 
applicability of Nollan/Dolan for analyzing the legal validity of CBAs. This focus on 
Nollan/Dolan leaves readers with the inaccurate impression that courts will apply 
these two cases primarily and perhaps exclusively if a CBA were challenged in court. 
However, in the interest of judicial economy, courts tend to reach issues in the order 
of primacy. If a finding on one issue makes another issue moot, a court will not rule 
on the subsequent issue. In order for the court to reach the issue of a regulatory 
taking, the court would have to first determine: 1. if the party was injured. 2. the 
CBA subject matter 3. the status of the CBA and 4. if the local government was 
involved, the land use approvals were the result of gaining exactions.  The court 
would have to unravel several complex legal issues before even deciding whether 
Nollan/Dolan is applicable to CBAs generally and to a particular CBA. 
The legal scholarship has glossed over the fact that Nollan/Dolan is only 
applicable in challenges raised by the developer. In order for a party to have 
 49 
standing in court it must have experienced the ‘injury-in-fact’.98 Only the 
developer99, not the local government nor the neighbors, can claim a regulatory 
taking injury. Therefore Nollan/Dolan is limited to instances where the developer is 
claiming (or counter-claiming) that the local government either on its own or 
through the community deprived it of property. 
Once the court determines that the party has proper standing to raise this 
issue, it would likely proceed to determine the subject matter of the CBA. In order to 
determine the subject matter, the courts will likely turn to the CBA itself. Ideally the 
subject matter would be stated in the CBA as part of the consideration provided by 
the community. However as was the case with the Atlantic Yards CBA discussed 
above, the consideration documented in the CBA does not indicate its true purpose. 
In the event that the CBA does not sufficiently define the subject matter of the CBA, 
courts may look to extrinsic evidence such as Memoranda of Understanding 
between the developer and the community, other documentation between the 
developer and the community or documentation between either party and the local 
government.  
Once the court has determined that the CBA is a land use CBA, it will then 
turn to the status of the agreement.  The court will begin by inquiring whether the 
local government was involved in negotiating the CBA. Nollan/Dolan analysis is only 
proper after a court has determined that the developer is granting benefits in return 
                                                        
98 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
99 Other parties that could potentially make these claims are parties legally required to provide 
benefits because of their relationship to the developer. One possible example is if the CBA required 
the buyer of the project to continue any obligations of the developer. I include these potentially liable 
parties within the term developer.  
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for a community’s support of land use approvals at the behest of the local 
government. According to Nadler, before applying the Nollan/Dolan tests “courts 
must first answer a much murkier question: whether or not the conditions imposed 
fall under the exactions jurisprudence of Nollan and Dolan…The key to determining 
whether Nollan and Dolan apply to community benefits agreements is deciding 
whether the negotiation of a CBA can be ‘fairly attributed’ to the state.”100 Although 
Nadler summarized the Nollan/Dolan jurisprudence before reaching the State 
Action Doctrine in his article, as a practical matter a community activist should first 
consider how much the local government has been involved before becoming too 
entangled in mastering Nollan/Dolan analysis. Nadler finds that determining when 
the State Action Doctrine has been triggered is tricky and uncertain.101  
The State Action Doctrine has been expanded to include circumstances 
where an individual is acting in a ‘public function’ and when the local government 
has an ‘entanglement’ with the private activity.102 Local government participation in 
CBAs may constitute an entanglement. Incorporating a CBA into a development 
agreement to empower the local government to enforce the CBA would “likely 
constitute state action.”103  The State Action Doctrine is also triggered if the state’s 
actions compelled a result. The courts have latitude to find that the state was 
sufficiently involved as to compel an outcome either through coercive power or 
simply providing aid to a private actor. 
                                                        
100 Nadler, Constitutionality, 605.  
101 Nadler, Constitutionality, 606. 
102 Nadler, Constitutionality, 606. 
103 Nadler, Constitutionality, 607. 
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Past New York examples may shed light on circumstances that might 
constitute state compulsion. The Bronx Borough President drafted a CBA for the 
failed Related-Kingsbridge Armory proposal.104 During the failed negotiations, the 
Bronx Borough President was highly involved.105 The CBA negotiations and the 
project failed because the developer and the community could not reach an 
agreement about imposing living wage requirements on future tenants.106 A court 
would likely consider this compulsion because the Bronx Borough President is an 
elected official that participates in ULURP. The only reason it might not trigger State 
Action Doctrine is that he does not have the authority to make a final ULURP 
decision.  
The City’s involvement with the West Harlem CBA is also problematic and 
would likely implicate the State Action Doctrine. The City, through the New York 
City Economic Development Corporation provided the community organization 
with funds to negotiate with Columbia University.107 This would qualify as tangible 
aid for a court looking to find state action. The local officials sitting on the West 
Harlem LDC board could also trigger the State Action Doctrine.108 Once the State 
Action Doctrine has been triggered, constitutional protections, including 
Nollan/Dolan tests, apply.  
While many past CBAs would likely trigger the State Action Doctrine, CBAs 
could be structured such that they do not trigger the State Action Doctrine. Local 
                                                        
104 Bronx Borough President Website Press Release August 26, 2009. 
http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/press/releases/2009-08-26.html (accessed March 2013). 
105 Nadler, Constitutionality, 622. 
106 Knakal, Congrats. 
107 NYCBA, Report, 22. 
108 West Harlem Local Development Corporation Website. 
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governments have, in existing CBAs, assumed a more active role than the general 
definition of CBAs necessitates.109 Laura Wolf-Powers, in her general assessment of 
CBAs found that when local government is involved it tends to be the legislative 
branch.110 This assessment seems to reflect local government involvement in New 
York City CBAs as well.  
Courts apply a different level of deference to local government depending on 
whether it is acting in legislative or administrative capacity.111 Courts initially 
viewed discretionary zoning decisions as administrative actions and therefore 
outside of politics.112 However over time the land use approval process has become 
more legislative in nature and courts no longer see planners and others with zoning 
authority as outside of politics.113 Land use challenges are usually fought in state 
court and rarely reach the Supreme Court but courts may use Nollan/Dolan to apply 
stricter scrutiny to takings challenges than other land use challenges.114 
In New York City, ULURP applications have both legislative and 
administrative characteristics. ULURP is structured such that elected officials 
(borough presidents and city councilmen) and administrators (members of the City 
Planning Commission) participate in the decision-making process. Either the City 
Planning Commission or the City Council will have final authority on an application. 
For certain applications or when a Borough President files for City Council review 
                                                        
109 See Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 2. (“However, most such arrangements involve local government 
actors much more directly than this suggests.”). 
110 See Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 2. (“Because city council members or other local elected officials often 
prompt or assist in the negotiations or officially sanction the resulting agreements, the legislative 
branch of local government is generally involved in a CBA.”) 
111 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls. 
112 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls. 
113 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls. 
114 See Ellickson, Been and Serkin, Land Use Controls, 197. 
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because the City Planning Commission approves an application that both the 
Borough President and the Community Board disapprove of, the City Council will 
make the final decision, as was the case in for Kingsbridge Armory project. Members 
of the public appointed by the elected Borough President to the Community Board 
also participate in ULURP.  
 Incorporating CBAs into ULURP would obviously trigger the State Action 
Doctrine. Participation by ULURP members in CBA negotiations would likely do so 
as well. However courts would likely treat different ULURP bodies differently. Since 
a Community Board does not have a binding vote its members may be able to 
participate in CBA negotiations without triggering State Action Doctrine. This 
leeway for the Community Board probably would not extend to the Community 
Board acting in an official capacity and linking its ULURP recommendation to the 
CBA. In that circumstance a court may see the facts as similar the conditions placed 
on Nollan and Dolan for their permits. Courts would likely look more carefully at the 
actions of the ULURP bodies as it proceeds towards a binding vote. 
c. Evading Nollan/Dolan 
 
CBAs can evade Nollan/Dolan constraints in a few ways. First Nollan/Dolan 
does not apply to truly private agreements. Court rulings are generally construed 
narrowly and do not create precedent for issues not at issue in the given case. 
Applying Nollan/Dolan to private agreements between developers and communities 
would be expanding Nollan/Dolan beyond its scope and would have no basis in 
constitutional law.  A CBA would remain private if the agreement was solely 
between developers and the community without any local government involvement. 
 54 
As the jurisprudence develops, local government may be able to have some 
involvement without transforming a private CBA into a public CBA.  
Second, some public CBAs may pass Nollan/Dolan scrutiny not because the 
benefits meet the two-prong test but because the CBA circumvents the test 
altogether. One way to achieve this circumvention is to create a separation between 
the benefits demanded and the approvals granted by masking a land use CBA as an 
economic development CBA. Laura Wolf-Powers found that “[i]n many CBAs… the 
matter at issue is not chiefly a zoning approval, but a public subsidy to a project 
maintaining a firewall between regulatory action and the benefits provided to 
advocacy groups.”115 If the CBA is viewed by the court as an agreement in exchange 
for a subsidy from the local government rather than in exchange for a discretionary 
land use approval, Nollan/Dolan does not apply because private actors do not have 
Fifth Amendment protections against the government when it is acting as a market 
participant rather than a regulator. 
d. Benefits of Public and Private CBAs 
 
Community representatives advocating for CBAs should begin by asking: Is this 
CBA in return for a land use approval? If so, do I achieve my goals better if the 
agreement is public or private? A community may prefer public CBAs even though 
they have more legal restrictions because a public CBA will also have more legal 
protections when it comes to implementing and enforcing the CBA. For example, if 
the public CBA has been incorporated into the development agreement or 
restrictive declaration then the local government will have recourse to uphold the 
                                                        
115 Wolf-Powers, Evidence, 3.  
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agreement in court. This may serve the community in the long run because the 
community may not have the capacity or resources to challenge the developer. This 
also relieves the community of some of the responsibility to monitor the 
implementation of the CBA.  
A community may prefer a private CBA because a community can negotiate 
for a wider range of benefits that would not pass the essential-nexus/roughly 
proportionate test. While these CBAs may allow for the community to gain benefits 
that are most responsive to their needs, private CBAs will not have the protection of 
local government.  
 The local political climate may dictate if the CBA will or should be public or 
private. Local governments may favor CBAs for some land use projects and not 
others. For example, in New York City, Mayor Bloomberg has wavered on his 
support of CBAs.116 Support for CBAs may also waver after failed negotiations  
prevent projects from the Kingsbridge Armory from redeveloping a vacant site in an 
area in need of tax revenue and jobs. The political climate might become more 
favorable for CBAs as communities become savvier about the impacts of 
development and the real estate market for redevelopment sites tightens.  
Neighbors have several disadvantages when negotiating CBAs with real estate 
developers. Neighbors are less organized and have fewer resources than the 
developer. Neighbors also learn about the development project after the developer 
has already decided on most of its objectives. Neighbors are in a defensive reactive 
                                                        
116 Pristin, Bronx Groups. (“In 2005, the Bloomberg administration publicly applauded a private 
agreement between housing advocates and Forest City Ratner, the developer of Atlantic Yards in 
Brooklyn, but now it no longer supports the concept.”)  
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position when negotiating the CBA. This thesis aims to mitigate some of these 
disadvantages by informing the neighbors of some of the legal constraints to 
prevent neighbors from negotiating for indefensible benefits or unenforceable 
agreements.   
VI. Conclusion  
a. Recommendations 
 
 Public or private, land use or economic development CBAs serve unique 
purposes for neighbors seeking to mitigate the impacts of development. Each type of 
CBA has its own merits. Neighbors can maximize their negotiating leverage with 
developers when they understand the implications of each type of CBA and know 
how to use each type of CBA to reach an ends. Economic development CBAs have the 
fewest legal constraints but the neighbors’ role is limited and defined by the local 
government.  Although land use CBAs have greater legal constraints they provide 
the neighbors with greater agency. Public CBAs shift some of the burden of 
implementation and enforcement from the neighbors to the local government but 
impose greater constraints on the available benefits. Private CBAs provide the 
neighbors with the greatest agency but require the most resources and 
organizational capacity from the neighbors.  
 Public  Private 
Land Use  Pros: Local government 
can assist in negotiation, 
implementation and 
enforcement. 
Cons: State Action 
Doctrine, regulatory 
takings, Nollan/Dolan; 
Pros: less legal risk of a 
regulatory taking; greater 
range of benefits available. 
Cons: places burden of 
defending the 
enforceability of the 
contract on the neighbors 
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more limited range of 
benefits available  
Economic Development Pros: Local government 
can require a developer 
enter into a CBA as a 
condition for the 
incentives. 
Cons: Local government 
creates and controls the 
parameters of the 
developer-neighbor 
agreement 
Pros: no legal constraints 




These recommendations are intended to alert neighbors and local 
government to potential legal issues of public or private CBAs. The aim is to prevent 
the CBA from failing either in the implementation or enforcement phase.  Since CBAs 
have not been challenged in court my recommendations are intended as general 
guide for what may become legal issues. CBA practitioners should first and foremost 
investigate whether there have been any recent developments in CBA case law.  
i. Initiate contact with the developer. 
 
As soon as the neighbors learn of a development project that will require 
land use approvals (possibly during the first public hearing) and impact the 
community, the neighbors should contact the developer to begin discussing the 
project and its impacts. The developer may have initiated contact with the 
neighbors as part of its effort to garner support for its forthcoming ULURP 
application. The neighbors should clearly communicate to the developer whether 
they would like the developer to communicate directly and exclusively with them 
without any local government involvement or if they would like to include local 
government in these early conversations.   
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ii.  Classify the type of CBA     
 
Once the community learns about the project, the community should 
determine the source of their bargaining power. First, the community should assess 
whether the developer is seeking land use approvals or subsidies (or both), and 
whether the developer is responding to an RFP. If the developer is seeking subsidies 
or responding to an RFP the community should identify whether, as part of that 
process, the local government is empowering the community to participate in the 
project selection process and in the negotiation of benefits that would mitigate the 
impacts of the project. If the developer does not need the community’s approval for 
the economic development application or if the developer is only seeking land use 
approvals then the neighbors need to pursue a more strategic negotiation with the 
developer. If possible, the neighbors should seek to link the consideration for the 
CBA to the economic development aspect of the project rather than the land use 
approvals.  
iii.    Identify goals prior to negotiation  
 
Neighbors should begin their internal organizing effort by identifying the 
impacts they are seeking to mitigate. Having identified the impacts and the corollary 
benefits, neighbors should engage in a superficial Nollan/Dolan inquiry. The results 
of this inquiry will inform the neighbors as to whether they should pursue a public 
or private CBA. If the benefits are essentially related to the project (i.e. building 
affordable housing as part of a housing development) and proportionate to the 
impact of the project (i.e. replacing the affordable units being displaced by this 
project) then neighbors can pursue a public CBA with local government’s assistance 
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and involvement, and still secure the desired benefits. Neighbors may prefer a 
public CBA because it shifts some of the resource and capacity burden to the local 
government. 
Even if all of the desired benefits would not trigger Nollan/Dolan, neighbors 
may want to wait on involving local government in case during negotiations, the 
benefits included would be the kind of benefits to trigger Nollan/Dolan. This stage of 
internal CBA organizing will be highly dependent on recent developments in state 
and federal case law. At this stage communities should contact CBA practitioners 
familiar to with the parameters of appropriate benefits.  
iv. Take caution when involving the local government 
 
If the desired benefits violate either of the two Nollan/Dolan tests, then the 
neighbors should make every effort to prevent local government from becoming 
involved in the process and triggering the State Action Doctrine. Even though it is 
counter-intuitive for the resource constrained community to refuse funds for 
coordinating the effort from the local government, receiving funds from the local 
government to hire a lawyer or organizing staff may turn the CBA negotiation into a 
state action. If the community is concerned about its capacity to organize without 
local government then it may want to reassess the impacts they are hoping to 
mitigate. The community organizers should assess whether increasing their 
organizational capacity is worth reducing the range of impacts they can seek to 
mitigate. Each CBA will present a unique set of factors that will determine the 
outcome in this tradeoff. 
v.     Include a severability clause  
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When drafting the CBA, the community should be particularly aware of the 
consideration provided for the benefits. If possible the benefits should be separated 
into benefits provided by the developer in response to regulatory requirements (for 
example, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in New York City) and benefits 
provided by the developer to the community as a result of the consideration 
provided for the CBA. Separating these benefits through the use of severability 
clauses or separate legal documents will enable a court to separate the legally 
offensive benefits from the legally sound benefits, thereby protecting the latter even 
if the former is found unenforceable. 
  
 
